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Abstract
When discussing the influence of Community 
law on national law the attention often focuses on 
(removing) conflicts of special national provisions 
with European law in concrete situations. In this 
article, however, a different, proactive facilitating 
approach is chosen, focusing on general 
administrative law especially as a facilitating 
instrument for the effective implementation of 
European law in a broad sense: the ‘PF-method’. 
The central question is whether by means of 
general provisions of administrative law, in a 
proactive way, even without European law forcing 
to this, the legal implementation, application and 
enforcement of European law may be simplified 
and facilitated.
Four topics are studied in depth: ‘fact-finding 
in administrative law proceedings’, ‘recovering 
state aid granted in breach of EC law’, ‘the division 
of liabilities for breach of Community law among 
various national authorities involved’ and ‘the 
embedding of the preliminary proceedings in the 
national law of administrative procedure’.
Solutions found with regard to Dutch general 
administrative law may provide inspiration for other 
member states in search of new or alternative 
possibilities for implementing EC law as effectively 
as possible. 
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61. Introduction 
As a result of the expansion and refinement of European Community (EC) law, 
its implementation into the national legal systems of the member states has received 
more and more attention in the past decades. This development can also be seen in 
the Netherlands, in particular as far as Dutch administrative law is concerned. This 
area of law has been and still is strongly influenced by European law. This influence 
manifests itself in certain special fields of law, such as competition law, environmental 
law and the law in respect of agriculture and fisheries, but the general standards and 
principles of administrative law are also subject to such influence. After all, general 
administrative law regulates (in part) the decisions taken by Dutch administrative 
bodies in implementing European Community law in the special fields.
When discussing the influence of Community law on national law the attention 
often focuses on (removing) conflicts of special national provisions with European 
law in concrete situations. The classical incorporation instruments of direct effect 
and consistent interpretation of national rules of law in the light of Community law 
(indirect effect) are important topics in that respect. 
In this article, however, we have chosen a different approach, focussing on general 
administrative law – which in the Netherlands has been for an important part included 
in the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) – especially as a facilitating instrument 
for the effective implementation of European law in a broad sense. The central question 
is whether by means of general provisions of administrative law, in a proactive way, 
even without European law forcing to this, the legal implementation, application 
and enforcement (hereinafter: ‘implementation’) of European law may be simplified 
and facilitated for Dutch regulators, administrative bodies and administrative courts 
charged with these tasks.1
This proactive facilitating approach to Dutch general administrative law seems 
to be rather innovative. Traditionally, the effective implementation of EC law relies 
primarily on specific statutory regulations specially designed for this purpose based 
on a direct obligation to that effect from European law. 
After this introduction the proposed proactive facilitating approach will therefore 
be explained in greater detail, whereby it will be indicated on which points it differs 
from the more traditional method in this connection (section 2). Subsequently four 
subtopics will be discussed in order to examine and to illustrate whether and, if so, 
how the applicable general administrative law may contribute to the implementation 
of European Community law in the Dutch legal system. The four topics concern ‘fact-
finding in administrative law proceedings’ (section 3), ‘recovering state aid granted 
in breach of EC law’, (section 4) ‘the division of liabilities for breach of Community 
law among various national authorities involved’ (section 5), and ‘the embedding of 
the preliminary proceedings in the national law of administrative procedure’ (section 
6). Solutions found with regard to Dutch general administrative law may provide 
inspiration for other member states in search of new or alternative possibilities for 
implementing EC law as effectively as possible. This contribution will be concluded 
with a few concluding remarks, in which the most important findings will be 
summarised (section 7).
72. The proactive facilitating method for the implementation of European law
2.1 PF-method
The European influence on Dutch administrative law has not passed unnoticed. 
In the literature broad attention is given to European directives which must be 
implemented and to European regulations for which national operational provisions 
must be drawn up. In both cases it often concerns administrative provisions in the 
special fields of law. In many cases the specific national implementation provisions 
that have been drawn up are not complete. For the concrete application of European 
law and its possible enforcement existing national regulations are (also) used, assuming 
institutional and procedural autonomy in the application of Community law. Within 
that framework Dutch scholars regularly discuss the question whether the precondition 
of effectiveness as formulated in the case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
has been met, which implies that the application of national rules in a concrete case 
must not lead to the situation that exercising the rights granted by the Community 
legal structure is made impossible or extremely difficult. Much attention is also 
given to (possible) conflicts between European law and Dutch provisions. Within 
that framework the classical incorporation instruments of direct effect and consistent 
interpretation of national provisions (indirect effect) are important topics. 
In these discussions the emphasis is often on Community obligations. Scholars 
examine at what points the Kingdom of the Netherlands fails to fulfil its Community 
obligations: where has European legislation been insufficiently implemented into 
Dutch law, where has conflict been observed between European and Dutch provisions 
and how should such conflict be resolved? In this contribution we will call that 
approach the traditional method.
As announced, in this article attention will be called to a second perspective 
on the relation between European law and Dutch (administrative) law. Within this 
perspective general administrative law is being viewed especially as a facilitating 
instrument for the legal implementation, application and enforcement of European 
law. As stated in the introduction, the central question in this respect is whether by 
means of general provisions of administrative law, in a proactive way, even without 
European law forcing to this, the legal implementation, application and enforcement 
of European law may be simplified and facilitated for Dutch regulators, administrative 
bodies and administrative courts charged with those tasks. Formulated more briefly: 
can a proactive, facilitating approach - the PF-method - within general administrative 
law contribute to a more effective incorporation of EC law into the national legal 
system?
Several related questions do arise. Is it possible to further facilitate the 
implementation of EC-decisions and other Community law by means of (adjusting) 
general administrative law? For instance, is it possible to include in the GALA certain 
parts of national implementing rules which are necessary or desirable from a European 
perspective, in such a way that omissions in special implementing regulations and 
related problems may be avoided in practice? Is it possible to provide a general 
regulation in the GALA for certain legal instruments developed within Community 
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practice? Can provisions be included in the GALA to give Dutch administrative courts 
more handles to work with when European provisions turn out to play a role in 
national disputes? In other words: can general administrative law – as the GALA 
has done within the Dutch legal system for administrative law – contribute to the 
harmonisation, unity and accessibility of national implementing regulations, to a more 
effective implementing practice and to a more European oriented judicial system? 
The topics studied in the following sections will serve as a means to try to arrive at 
a general answer to these questions.
2.2 Legal context
Now that the proactive facilitating method has been opposed against the traditional 
method and the distinguishing criterion in this respect is that on the basis of the 
latter method only implementing measures will be taken when European law obliges 
to this, it is appropriate to briefly pay attention to the general legal context for the 
incorporation of European law into the national legal system. 
First of all there may be concrete obligations for taking implementing measures. 
Such an obligation most clearly exists when a directive contains the obligation to 
realise within a certain period national implementing legislation. Such an obligation 
also arises in the case in which an existing national rule comes into conflict with 
European law. Although in such a situation it will in first instance be the national 
court (or the administration) which will have to exclude application of the national 
rule when an interpretation in conformity with Community law is not possible, there 
will at the same time arise an obligation for the legislator to change the national rule 
in order to end the conflict (Lenaerts & Van Nuffel 2005, p. 665-673).
Apart from this kind of cases national authorities are also obliged in a general sense 
to take implementing measures when this follows from the principle of loyalty to the 
Community laid down in Article 10 EC. On the one hand, this principle reinforces the 
obligations which already result from concrete rules of Community law. On the other 
hand, due to the dynamic case law of the ECJ on this matter, more or less independent 
supplementary obligations also follow from it, albeit always in relation to other rules of 
Community law. Article 10 EC asks the member states to take all appropriate measures, 
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of 
this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. This 
obligation applies to all national authorities concerned, including legislator and courts. 
From Article 10 EC both positive and negative obligations result. On the one hand, 
States must take measures to ensure the effective operation of Community law. On 
the other hand, States must also refrain from measures which preclude such effective 
operation (cf. Jans et al. 2007, p. 37-39). Within the context of this contribution it 
would carry too far to make an inventory of the obligations which the ECJ has derived 
from Article 10 EC. It suffices to refer to a quotation of Temple Lang from his study 
into the meaning of Article 10 EC: “In short, Article 10 is not a legal basis for making 
justiciable every weakness in the national application of Community rules. However, 
within the limits summarised above, it does seem (…) to impose a duty on all national 
9authorities and courts to make the Community legal system work effectively in the 
way that it was objectively intended to work.” (Temple Lang 2001, p. 93).
From the above it follows that within the framework of the loyalty of the member 
states to the Community, coupled to Community obligations, facilitating measures are 
in principle also asked for (cf. Jans et al. 2007, p. 37). However, within the framework 
of the PF-method one further step is taken: it is examined whether, independent 
from the existence of Community obligations, measures are conceivable which may 
contribute (further) to the effective incorporation of European law. 
Before proceeding to the four topics of this study, it may therefore be stated in 
a general sense that the PF-method which we propose consists of several aspects: 
attention for general administrative law, instead of a case-by-case adaptation of special 
national legislation in particular fields of law; a focus on facilitating the effectiveness 
of European law in the national legal order, instead of only remedy breaches; and 
a proactive approach to the adaptation of national law to European law standards, 
irrespective of whether a direct obligation in European law exists for this. 
3. Fact-finding in administrative law proceedings
3.1 Introduction
For the implementation of European law it is of great importance how and with 
which intensity the courts review whether a national decision agrees with EC law. 
In Dutch administrative law it is a significant question whether the courts must 
themselves investigate if the decision has been taken in conformity with EC law, or that 
they can suffice with a review whether the administration has sufficiently investigated 
such conformity. The Administrative Law Division of the Council of State2 usually 
opts for the latter review.3 In that case the courts themselves do not have to carry out 
all kinds of complicated factual assessments. They then only have to review whether 
the investigation carried out by the administration has been sufficient, on the basis 
of principles such as the requirement of due care and the justification principle. 
This way of review fits in with the review in general Dutch administrative law. In 
its ruling the court as a rule does not give a final assessment whereby it establishes 
the legal relationship between administrative body and interested party. It reviews 
the legitimacy of a decision, including the legitimacy of the fact-finding on which 
that decision is based. In the Dutch discourse there is a discussion about this review 
and then in particular about the question whether the courts should review the fact-
finding more intensively and should themselves establish the facts. From a European 
legal perspective too a more intensive review of the facts may be argued for. Do the 
courts at present offer private individuals actually enough legal protection, so that 
they can effectuate their rights derived from EC law and do the courts sufficiently 
check if the administration has complied with EC law? Only when the facts in dispute 
have definitively been established, it may be determined whether or not a European 
legal rule has been correctly applied. 
Further to these questions it has been investigated how the Dutch administrative 
law courts review the fact-finding,4 whether this review meets the requirements of EC 
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law and whether an adjustment of the national review would further the incorporation 
of EC law (Schuurmans 2007, p. 115-142).
3.2 Judicial review of facts in Dutch administrative law procedures 
The Dutch administrative law courts usually do not establish any facts; they 
review the assessment of the facts by the administration. It is difficult to find out 
how intensively they do this, since usually very few reasons are given for the factual 
assessment. It often remains unclear which arguments, supported with which evidence, 
the parties have put forward in the proceedings. Furthermore, an explicit weighing of 
arguments and evidence by the court is often lacking. It is then impossible to establish 
how strictly the court reviews the assessment of the facts by the administrative 
body. However some data are known from empirical research (Barkhuysen, Damen 
et al. 2007, p. 290). In cases in which the finding of the facts by the administration 
is in dispute, the courts give in 28% of the cases a negative judgement about the 
soundness of the fact-finding. The court mostly formulates its opinion on the facts 
very cautiously. It then suffices with the conclusion that the administrative body has 
insufficiently investigated the facts or has given insufficient reasons for its decision. 
Therefore, when giving a negative assessment, the court leaves in four of the five 
cases room for the administrative body to arrive at an identical finding of the facts. 
It follows from this that in very few cases the administrative law court gives a final 
assessment of the facts.
The question whether this national review is in accordance with EC law may be 
studied both by means of the traditional method and the PF-method. In the traditional 
approach breaches of the law are looked for. In that case we are looking for cases in 
which the ECJ has observed that EC law has been breached, because the national 
court’s review of the fact-finding by the administration has not been strict enough. 
In this case this traditional approach provides little information. The question of the 
intensity of the judicial review is so abstract and theoretical that case law mostly 
does not give a direct answer to this. But it is possible to find cases in which indirect 
judgements are given about the required judicial review of the finding of the facts. 
For instance in case law the question is discussed whether the court should accept 
new evidence and whether it is itself obliged to carry out any further investigation 
into a fact. In this way it may be found out whether a court must itself investigate 
the facts by appointing an expert, if a party disputes the scientific evidence in a case 
about medicine registration. Such case law provides very detailed information about 
the fact-finding in specific policy areas, but it is difficult to derive from it a general 
standard for the national judicial review of the finding of the facts. Case after case an 
administrative court may be faced with the question if and how it should investigate 
a fact. Each time a preliminary question might be asked about this, but it is likely a 
court will hardly do this.
This traditional investigation method has led to the situation that in Dutch legal 
literature it is in general assumed, further to the case Upjohn II,5 that the method 
of review in the Netherlands, as explained before, is satisfactory. After all, the 
Netherlands has never been found guilty of an inadequate review of the facts by the 
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administrative courts. Moreover, the law of evidence and the rules of fact-finding are 
part of the law of procedure, which partly belongs to the autonomy of the member 
state. Taking into account the principles of equivalence and effectiveness, it appears 
that the equivalence principle is not violated; as said, the review fits in with the 
one applied in general Dutch administrative law procedures. Upjohn II showed that 
in that particular policy area the principle of effectiveness did not require that the 
national court can substitute its assessment of the facts for the assessment made by 
the administrative body. It seems that from this case the rule can be derived that if the 
administrative body has discretion and the fact-finding is of a specialised nature, the 
national court is not obliged to give its own factual judgement and it may marginally 
review the fact-finding.6 This conclusion sounds cautious, for it is in fact based on 
a single ruling which is only explicit about reviews in cases in the field of medicine 
registration.
The aforementioned case Upjohn II may not only be used in the traditional method, 
but it also provides clues for applying the PF-method. The fact that it cannot be 
expected from the national court to carry out fact-finding on its own is also partly 
substantiated by the ECJ by pointing at its own method of review.7
 ‘Consequently, Community law does not require the Member States to establish 
a procedure for judicial review of national decisions revoking marketing 
authorisations, taken pursuant to Directive 65/65 and in the exercise of complex 
assessments, which involves a more extensive review than that carried out by 
the Court in similar cases.’8
So, it cannot be required of the national court to apply a more intensive review than 
that of the ECJ. In this way the ECJ’s own review of the fact-finding sets a standard. 
The next paragraph will deal with the question to what extent the review of the facts 
by the Community courts agrees with or deviates from the national review. In this 
respect the fact-finding in case of direct action has been looked at.9 This comparison is 
an application of the PF-method. If we were to find out that our national review of the 
fact-finding agrees to a large extent with the review by the Community courts, we have 
to worry little about the danger of future law infringements (proactive aspect). However 
if there turn out to be differences between the two methods of review, the question is 
whether there is sufficient justification for this. An adjustment of the national review 
might lead to a more effective incorporation of Community law (facilitating aspect).
3.3 Similarities and differences in the review by the Community courts 
and the national courts
A certain development may be observed in the review of the fact-finding by the 
Community courts in case of direct action. That process has been extensively described 
by Craig (Craig 2006). When the ECJ still functioned as court in first instance in case 
of direct action, the investigation of the facts by the ECJ was very limited. It made 
almost no use of its investigative powers (Ress 1992, p. 183).10 In certain cases it has 
even explicitly acknowledged a marginal review of the fact-finding. In some policy 
areas administrative institutions of the Community have a large discretionary power, 
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e.g. in the field of agricultural policy or in the field of protective trade measures. That 
discretionary power may not only extend to the interpretation of factual standards. If a 
Community institution must make a complicated factual assessment, the discretion of 
the administrative body refers to a certain extent also to the fact-finding. In such cases, 
the Community judicature must limit itself to examining the accuracy of the findings 
of fact and law made by the authority concerned and to verifying, in particular, that 
the action taken by that authority is not vitiated by a manifest error or a misuse of 
powers and that it did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion.
The Court of First Instance (CFI) also applies this marginal review, but a completely 
different culture prevails within this court. It devotes long considerations to the 
factual findings and often refers to information which it has obtained from interviews 
or further to written questions.11 This culture shift was intended. One of the reasons 
for setting up the CFI was the need for making possible a more intensive assessment 
of the facts, in particular in cases in which fact-finding is complex (Lenaerts, Arts 
& Maselis 2006, p. 15). For Dutch administrative law two points are relevant in this 
respect. In the first place the explicit acknowledgement that in case of complex fact-
finding the Community courts must apply a marginal review. In the Dutch doctrine, 
however, that is no foregone conclusion. In the second place it is striking that, in 
spite of that marginal review, the CFI uses much judicial activity for reviewing the 
administrative fact-finding. Moreover the CFI gives fairly extensive reasons for its 
factual judgement.
We have also examined to which extent (the statement of grounds of) the judicial 
review differs and whether Dutch administrative law could learn something from the 
approach chosen by the Community court. Two cases have been studied in greater 
depth, since in these cases the Community court works out how and in which way it 
reviews the assessment of the facts by the Community administration.12 Pfizer13 and 
Tetra Laval14 show that the consequence of a marginal review is not that the court 
studies the evidence globally. The Community court examines if the evidence is 
factually correct, reliable and consistent and if the administrative body has collected 
all relevant information. If expert information plays a role in the decision-making, 
it will be assessed on the basis of principles such as ‘expertise, transparency and 
independence’ whether the administration has used this information correctly. The 
fact that a review is carried out marginally does not affect the requirements of division 
of the burden of proof, standard of proof and assessment of the evidence.15 But the 
consequence of a marginal review is that when no errors or only negligible errors have 
been made in the fact-finding, the administrative qualification of the facts remains 
in principle intact.
In a comparison with Dutch administrative law a few matters again attract attention. 
If the fact-finding in a case is complex, the court will especially review the fact-
finding procedure in the preparation of the decision. To this extent there is a clear 
parallel between the CFI and the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State. 
Nevertheless, there are also differences. The Dutch administrative law courts review 
the administrative fact-finding very generally against the requirement of due care, 
without indicating explicitly which concrete elements are considered. The review 
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by the Community court has been worked out in greater detail and in its ruling the 
Court fairly extensively accounts for its review of the factual judgement. By carefully 
reviewing the fact-finding procedure, the Community court also reviews to a great 
extent whether the established facts agree with the truth. 
As said, both at the Community and the national courts, part of the judicial review 
focuses on the standards which the administration must observe in the decision-
making. The question whether the administration has observed the requirement 
of due care and the justification principle may start to dominate. The Community 
courts also apply these principles (Groussot 2006, p. 253-257; Tridimas 2006, p. 406 
ff.). Remarkable in this respect is the strong connection which the ECJ and the CFI 
establish between the procedural requirements and a marginal review of the fact-
finding. Since Technische Universität München it has been established case law that 
the court lays extra emphasis on the procedural requirements when a Community 
institution exercises a discretionary power.
 ‘However, where the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal, 
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative 
procedures is of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, 
in particular, the duty of the competent institution to examine carefully and 
impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case, the right of the person 
concerned to make his views known and to have an adequately reasoned decision. 
Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal elements 
upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.’16
The high requirements set for the investigation and the statement of grounds of the 
administrative assessment of the facts make it possible for the Community courts to 
carry out a careful review at law. After all, they can only carefully examine whether 
the Community institution has drawn logical conclusions from the collected evidence 
if an adequate statement of reasons has been provided for the decision. The Dutch 
administrative courts, however, do not explicitly establish a connection between a 
strict review of the procedural requirements in the decision-making and a marginal 
review at law. 
3.4 How can the implementation of European Community law be facilitated?
The investigation on the basis of the PF-method has revealed quite a lot of differences 
between the national review of the finding of the facts by the administrative courts 
and the review by the Community courts. More attention of national courts for the 
way of review of fact-finding by the Community courts might lead to a more detailed 
elaboration of the national test of due care. In the case law of the Dutch administrative 
law courts it might be made explicit that the court is obliged to review whether the 
evidence is factually correct, reliable and consistent, whether the administrative body 
has collected all relevant information and has drawn logical conclusions from the 
evidence. This does not mean that at present the national courts do not apply these 
requirements. However, making the above-mentioned requirements more explicit 
would clarify the nature of the Dutch judicial review of the facts and give the parties 
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to the proceedings more legal certainty. Moreover, the Community case law gives 
more clarity about the meaning of the concept of marginal review for the assessment 
of the facts. 
A clear review of the administrative fact-finding, which fits in with the Community 
method of review, may lead to more effective legal protection and definitive dispute 
resolution. Parties may better be able to estimate whether the finding of the facts will 
survive the judicial review, and the concrete requirements will guarantee a careful 
judicial review. When the national courts check more intensively whether a decision 
based on Community law is based on sound fact-finding,17 it will reduce the risk that 
they will fail to see a breach of Community law. In this way the implementation of 
EC law can be facilitated.
4. Recovery of state aid granted in breach of EC law
4.1. Introduction 
By now it must be fairly generally known that the granting of state aid, in whatever 
form, is no longer possible without taking into account the applicable European 
Community law. It concerns the basic Articles 87 and 88 in the EC Treaty, secondary 
legislation, various forms of soft law, and a bulk of case law of the ECJ and CFI. When 
aid is granted without taking any notice of this European state aid law, there will be a 
risk that such grant must be considered as unlawful and the aid in question, including 
the interest on it, will have to be recovered from the beneficiary or beneficiaries. In 
the Community case law such recovery is seen as the logical consequence of the fact 
that the state aid in question was granted contrary to Community law. This concrete 
obligation for a member state could in particular arise from a so-called recovery 
decision taken by the European Commission. 
Starting from the traditional approach to the implementation of Community law 
obligations, one could in this field await such a recovery decision and consider on 
a case-by-case basis whether the effectuation of the decision will be possible. How 
the recovery of unlawful state aid must be legally realised, is left to the law of the 
member state in which the breach of Community law has been committed. However, 
a disadvantage of this approach is that when it turns out that the national law is not 
sufficiently tailored to the recovery of the unlawfully granted aid, or to the collection 
of the interest enjoyed on it, the member state runs the risk to be faced with infraction 
proceedings, with all possible financial consequences. After all, the techniques of 
consistently interpreting national law and if needed excluding the application of 
national provisions which are contrary to Community law do not offer a solution in 
all situations. That is certainly the case if no appropriate national legal provisions 
turn out to exist by virtue of which the Community obligation must be fulfilled. 
Recent infraction proceedings instituted against the Netherlands are illustrative in 
this connection, since in a concrete case of unlawfully granted aid to the company 
Fleuren Compost the Dutch state turned out to be incapable to immediately fulfil 
the obligation to recover from the recipient in addition to the aid granted also the 
interest enjoyed on it.18 
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Although in respect of realising the recovery of state aid Community law sets 
in principle only (strict) preconditions, the principle of loyalty to the Community 
implies in general the obligation for the member states to organise their national law 
such that they can meet the Community obligations associated with the recovery of 
unlawful state aid. If they fail to do this, it may lead to proceedings for breach of the 
Treaty, with all their consequences. 
It has therefore been investigated in this contribution, applying the PF-method, 
if Dutch administrative law (of procedure), quite apart from an immediate recovery 
obligation, has been sufficiently tailored to carrying out recovery of state aid which 
has been unlawfully granted and is declared to be incompatible with the common 
market. Insofar as that does not turn out to be the case, it has been investigated how 
Dutch administrative law (of procedure) may further facilitate an effective recovery 
of unlawful state aid, including interest on it (and with it the implementation of 
European law).19 
4.2 Recovery of unlawful state aid in Dutch administrative law (of procedure) 
In the Netherlands there is no general State Aid Act, which includes a single 
general regulation for the recovery of unlawfully granted state aid. Only for a certain 
category of ‘administrative’ aid measures, namely subsidies within the meaning of 
Article 4:21 of the GALA, the GALA provides for generally written provisions about 
withdrawal, modification and recovery.20 
Insofar as the general provisions in the GALA in respect of subsidies are applicable 
to a certain aid measure, it must be emphasised that the current text of the GALA does 
not include a single reference to European state aid law. Neither do the provisions 
which refer to termination of subsidy relations and recovery. Within the framework 
of the drafting of the GALA attention has actually been paid to state aid law, but at 
the time the legislator did not consider it very well possible, and neither necessary 
to include in the GALA general rules in respect of (the recovery of) aid.21 So, for the 
implementation of recovery decisions of the Commission in relation to aid in the 
form of a subsidy the ‘ordinary’ general subsidy provisions, as included in the GALA, 
should in principle be taken as starting point. 
Only for certain kinds of subsidies, namely granted by various departments at state 
level, special rules exist about withdrawal and recovery which have been tailored to the 
recovery of state aid. These rules are implied in the various subsidy framework Acts.22 
These regulations tailored to the recovery of state aid cannot be relied upon as regards 
subsidies of the ministries in question outside the framework Acts and forms of state 
aid (whether or not in the form of subsidies) from local and regional authorities. 
It also occasionally occurs that local and regional authorities have general subsidy 
regulations with provisions for recovery tailored to the recovery of state aid, but as 
yet we estimate their number to be very small (Den Ouden, Jacobs & Verheij 2004, 
p. 257). 
However, it appears that it is rather difficult to apply the general provisions in 
the GALA in their current form in the context of the recovery of unlawful state aid. 
According to the system of the GALA subsidy amounts or advance payments can 
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only be recovered if they have been unduly paid (Article 4:57 GALA). This supposes 
that the legal basis for the payment no longer exists. Here, a problem arises, due to 
the mandatory limiting grounds for repeal or alteration of administrative decisions 
underlying the subsidy granted.
Furthermore, on the basis of the current provisions in the GALA it does not appear 
to be possible to meet the requirement that in addition to the actual aid the interest 
enjoyed on it will actually also be recovered. Apart from exceptions in special subsidy 
laws, such as the subsidy framework Acts mentioned above, no basis can be found 
for this in the written general administrative law.23 
The current provisions in the GALA, for that matter, also fail as regards the 
limitation periods included in them, both in respect of the repeal of subsidy decisions 
and in respect of the recovery of unduly paid amounts. According to EC state aid 
law recovery of unlawful state aid may be ordered up to ten years after the aid has 
been granted. In Dutch administrative law the power to repeal subsidy decisions and 
to recover subsidies and advance payments appears on the contrary to be coupled 
to a limitation period of five years. Only in the subsidy framework Act mentioned 
it has been explicitly provided that limitation periods from the GALA do not apply 
to the cancellation or alteration of subsidies which are in conflict with ‘obligations 
of the state under a treaty’. It would benefit the legal certainty if it were also made 
explicitly possible over the full width of national law to recover unlawful state aid 
during a period of ten years from the moment the aid was granted, including the 
interest enjoyed on it.
Still apart from these shortcomings, it appears that the provisions in the GALA 
about repeal, alteration and recovery, as indicated, can only be applied to a certain 
category of aid measures, namely subsidies within the meaning of the GALA. For 
the recovery of other forms of state aid, like tax measures and private law contracts, 
not being subsidies within the meaning of the GALA, other provisions should in any 
case be looked for.
For the recovery of some of these aid measures which actually take the form of 
an administrative decision unwritten public law may at present still offer a solution. 
The fact is that in administrative case law it is assumed that from unwritten law 
both an (implied) power to repeal and a power to recover may be derived.24 These 
powers which have been acknowledged in unwritten law concern in principle unduly 
paid subsidies, but also apply to other financial provisions under administrative 
law. However, according to established case law this unwritten public law expressly 
does not provide a basis for claiming interest. According to the Administrative Law 
Division of the Council of State for this power a basis is required in written national 
administrative law.25
4.4 How can the implementation of European Community law be facilitated?
So current Dutch administrative law (of procedure) offers various possibilities 
for setting the recovery of unlawful state aid in motion on the instruction of the 
Commission, but it has certainly not yet been tailored on all points to the full 
implementation of the community obligations in this respect. 
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Before discussing a few options in Dutch administrative law (of procedure) for the 
further facilitation of the incorporation of Community law, it should be noted that in 
some cases from a national legal point of view recovery may also still be realised via 
another legal route, e.g. via private law. In principle Community law is unbiased as 
regards the way in which a member state carries out a recovery obligation, provided 
that it complies with the Community principles of equivalence and effectiveness. 
However, the chance that in particular the latter precondition of equivalence is 
breached probably increases when all kinds of legal tricks must be applied in order 
to be able to carry out the Community recovery obligations, let alone that this will 
benefit a prompt and effective recovery. 
It will for that matter be possible to resolve some bottlenecks by means of a 
Community friendly interpretation of the applicable national law. But, that does 
not alter the fact that the legislator will continue to have the obligation to organise 
the national law in such a way that it will be beyond all doubt that the obligations 
resulting from Community law can be fulfilled. As regards legislation the following 
three options are then conceivable for the further facilitation of the implementation 
of Community law. 
The first option is to regulate all legal aspects of granting aid, including the recovery 
of unlawful state aid, in a general state aid Act, which covers all relevant areas of national 
law.26 The great advantage of such an Act seems to be that the state aid problem may be 
fully dealt with at the member state level, whereby traditional demarcations between 
different areas of law and associated (procedural) impediments will be passed over. On 
the other hand such an Act will actually be a very draconian measure, which under 
pressure of Community law may actually be applied in the national law, but which fails 
to do justice to the different characteristics of the various areas of national law. 
The second option is to create as few rules as possible on the general level and to 
actually provide recovery possibilities in special regulations on both the national level 
and the local and regional level. In order to create a comprehensive system for the 
recovery of unlawful aid via this option, it is required that all regulations, agreements 
and other relevant legal documents which may regulate the various forms of granting 
aid will explicitly provide for the possibility to undo the aid, including interest enjoyed 
on it. On both the central state level and the local and regional government level this 
requires an enormous wave of legislation and besides a great alertness in situations 
of atypical granting of aid which does not very well fit in with current regulations. 
This solution for making Dutch law on the recovery of unlawful state aid Europe proof 
will encourage a great fragmentation, which from the viewpoint of transparency and 
legal certainty is undesirable, and sometimes it will just be forgotten. 
The third option in our opinion is the golden mean: neither one general regulation, 
nor just many special provisions, but aiming to connect with already existing general 
regulations in the various areas of national law. In this way justice can be done to the 
various areas’ own systems and still be provided for recovery methods which have a 
general character.27 As already noted above, in the past when drafting the GALA the 
Dutch legislator did not consider it necessary to provide for a regulation aimed at 
the recovery of state aid. The argument for this was that the Community restrictions 
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on the exercise of national subsidy powers would directly result from Community 
law.28 Although the latter argument is in itself correct, it does not alter the fact that 
nevertheless a problem arises when there are no national powers in this respect. 
Precisely for those situations the national legislator should provide an appropriate 
regulation.29 By now it seems that the Dutch legislator has itself also been convinced 
of the necessity of this.30 
With a view to an effective implementation of the recovery of unlawful state aid it 
is advisable to explicitly include in the GALA in any case a possibility for the repeal 
of favourable decisions because of conflict with the Community law in respect of 
granting aid. Further, a general basis for the power to recover unduly paid amounts 
and a basis for the power to claim interest in the case of unlawfully granted state aid 
over the whole period in which the beneficiary has enjoyed the aid should be laid 
down in the GALA. Under the influence of Community regulations and case law the 
scope of the state aid issue is by now so broad, that the GALA is actually the most 
appropriate place for a regulation in administrative law. 
These solutions found in Dutch general administrative law may, even if not strictly 
necessary or applicable in every case of recovery of state aid, facilitate the proper 
implementation of European Community law in this field of law, in the interest of 
all actors concerned. 
5.  The division of liabilities for breach of Community law among various 
national authorities involved
5.1 Introduction
Within the Community legal system many legal rules are addressed to the 
member states. This implies that from those legal rules in first instance rights and 
obligations result for the national governments as representatives of those member 
states. That does not alter the fact that in their daily practice many local and regional 
administrative authorities are also faced in many ways with European law. After all, 
for all government bodies it applies that they must comply with Community law. So 
local and regional regulations must not come into conflict with Community law and 
the daily administrative practice of local and regional administrative bodies must also 
be given shape within the limits resulting from European law. For instance, when 
awarding public contracts the tendering directives must be observed and within 
the subsidy policy the Community state aid law discussed above must be taken 
into account. Local and regional authorities must also regularly make an effort to 
implement European regulations. Examples are the effectuation of the Structural 
Funds and the enforcement of Community legal rules, e.g. in the field of environmental 
protection. In both activities local and regional authorities play an important role in 
the Netherlands.
Given the complex matter of EC law, local and regional authorities are not always 
sufficiently aware of their role in its implementation, effectuation and enforcement. 
That fact is well-known in the Netherlands. For that reason in the past years many 
measures have already been taken to improve the level of knowledge of European law 
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of local and regional authorities.31 Nevertheless, mistakes are being made. Especially 
the affair in connection with the local implementation of the European Social Fund 
by the manpower services organisation (arbeidsvoorzieningsorganisatie) taught that 
the failure to comply with Community legal rules by local and regional bodies may 
cost dearly to the member state the Netherlands (and so to the government). Over 
the period 1994/1996 the inadequate implementation led to 157 million euro being 
recovered by the European Commission. 
In the Netherlands this issue has led to an intensive discussion about the question 
of whether and how the government can accomplish that local and regional authorities 
will fulfil their Community obligations. In this discussion, which continues until this 
day, two questions take central place. The first question concerns the supervisory 
instruments of the central government. In spite of the fact that from European case 
law no clear obligations for the member states can be derived, in the Netherlands 
a great deal of thought is devoted to the question whether it is possible to shape 
administrative supervisory powers in such a way that fulfilment of Community 
obligations by local and regional authorities, if needed, may be enforced effectively 
by the government, while justice will also be done to specific principles of Dutch 
constitutional law.32 
The second question is related with the costs which may be connected with 
breaches of European law by local and regional authorities. If the State (i.e. the central 
government in the Netherlands) is held liable for this by private individuals or by 
the European Commission, the State cannot defend itself by referring to the local or 
regional authority, as is apparent from the case law.33 So, when irregularities lead to a 
penalty, fine, recovery of European money or other financial sanctions, the State must 
pay. Whether the State can recover such costs from the ‘culprit’ is a question which 
must be answered according to the national legal rules.34 Dutch law does so far not 
offer many possibilities in that respect. Viewed from the traditional method there is 
neither any reason for making further rules; after all, so long as the government can 
be held responsible and pays, the Netherlands fulfils the Community obligations. 
However, in practice it turns out that for instance the absence of a clear right of 
recourse has led to other measures by the central government in order to retrieve 
‘lost money’ and so to prevent financial deficits. This procedure led to risk-avoiding 
behaviour by local and regional authorities: they no longer wanted to have anything 
to do with European subsidies. This led the Netherlands to being in danger of losing 
large sums of European money, with all the associated social consequences. From a 
proactive perspective there is therefore every reason to ask the following question: 
how may an administrative right of recourse be given shape in such a way that justice 
will be done to the responsibilities of the various national authorities involved in the 
implementation of Community law?
These two questions have been investigated from the perspective of general 
administrative law as an instrument for the possible facilitation of the effective 
implementation of EC law (De Kruif & Den Ouden 2007, p. 233-256). Is it useful to 
draw up (more) general rules of administrative law about administrative supervisory 
powers and recourse of costs from local and regional authorities in case of breach 
20
of EC law? Can general administrative law facilitate in this way the incorporation 
of EC law?
5.2 Supervision
As said, from a European law perspective responsibility and liability towards the 
EC for the fulfilment of Community obligations by local and regional authorities 
lie with the central government. However, in Dutch constitutional law local and 
regional authorities are traditionally given much freedom of action (autonomy). 
So it is important for the legislator to find a balance between the obligations and 
responsibilities which result from Community law on the one hand and the principles 
of the Dutch form of government on the other hand. 
Recently the Dutch government published an official standpoint entitled ‘The 
European dimension of supervision. EU law and the relation between state and 
local and regional authorities’.35 In this publication the government establishes that 
the current statutory supervisory instruments of the government are failing. Classic 
enforcement instruments, of which suspension and annulment of decisions of local 
and regional authorities are the most important ones, are not always sufficient. After 
all, they cannot be used to force local and regional authorities to act, which is often 
actually needed in order to be able to fulfil Community obligations. The current 
Dutch regulations about neglect of duties by local and regional authorities neither 
offer a solution. There is discussion about the scope of these regulations, but it is 
certain that Community obligations which have not been transposed into national 
legislation are not covered by them. Moreover, often it is not the government which 
can act correctively under a regulation on neglect of duties. Usually the power of 
decision moves up to a higher local or regional authority. 
The Dutch government tries to find the solution for these problems especially in a 
power for ministers to give so-called ‘special instructions’ whose nature may be both 
preventive and repressive. With such instruction powers the supervisory instruments 
of the government may be made ‘Europe proof’. 
A preventive, special instruction implies that in an individual case a minister gives 
a specific order to another government body in respect of the fulfilment of Community 
obligations. Dutch law already includes such a power in the European Subsidies 
Supervision Act (Wet Toezicht Europese Subsidies). From the parliamentary papers 
to this Act it becomes clear how the government views the concrete application of 
this power. In those papers the government emphasises the far-reaching nature of the 
instruction. Therefore this power must be used sparingly. In the European Subsidies 
Supervision Act it has been laid down that before giving an instruction a minister 
must first consult with the local or regional administrative body involved. It has also 
been laid down in the European Subsidies Supervision Act that – apart from urgent 
cases – the minister may only give an instruction after he has set a period in which 
the default may be remedied or prevented by the local or regional administrative body 
itself. So, the instruction is an ‘ultimum remedium’: an instrument that will only be 
relevant when such matters as information, advice, codes of conduct and consultations 
have not led to the desired result. Finally, from the explanatory memorandum it is 
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apparent that when giving an instruction the minister cannot suffice with simply 
pointing at a Community obligation or with establishing that such obligations must be 
fulfilled by the local or regional authorities called upon. Instructions must contribute 
to a proper implementation of the Community law in question. The government wants 
to accomplish this ‘by forcing the administrative body in question to comply with 
this regulation in a manner as indicated by the central government, respectively to 
observe the preconditions set’.36 A preventive instruction must therefore be rather 
concrete. 
The cabinet’s standpoint shows that it is not intended to provide a general 
preventive instruction authority to ministers, for instance in the GALA. As yet it will 
have to be examined for each sub-area and so for each specific statutory regulation 
if introduction of this far-reaching power is desirable. 
According to the cabinet, in new legislation the ministers must also get the general 
power to give repressive instructions to local and regional authorities. That possibility 
is needed for cases in which the European Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, 
the Dutch courts or the European Commission establish that in a concrete case a 
local or regional authority has failed to fulfil Community obligations. When the 
failure to fulfil a Community obligation by a local or regional authority consists of 
failing to act, a classic suspension or annulment power is of no good, as already 
noted above. After all, the local or regional authority fails to take the necessary 
decisions. But in accordance with the principle of loyalty to the Community and 
the practical circumstance that the central government is liable for the Community, 
it is necessary according to the government that the central government can give 
mandatory instructions. For this power too the government emphasises in the official 
standpoint that legal conditions must apply. The central government may only use 
this instrument when after using lighter instruments the local or regional authority 
remains in default, and the application itself must be legally regulated. 
The government does not indicate in which statutory regulation that power might be 
laid down. Since it concerns a general power, regulation in the GALA seems obvious. 
The fact is that Title 10.2 GALA already contains a regulation on the supervision of 
administrative bodies. The power to give repressive instructions may be added to this, 
so that it applies in all policy areas without this having each time to be determined 
in specific regulations.
5.3 Division of liability 
In the standpoint of the government it is also established that in the Netherlands 
it is not simple to recover from the local or regional authority involved any financial 
losses resulting from the failure to fulfil obligations. Those losses may exist of fines 
imposed on the Netherlands under Article 228 EC, or other losses for the central 
government, e.g. consisting of the recovery of European subsidies by the Commission. 
It may be doubted whether the non-compliance with Community obligations by local 
or regional administrative bodies can be qualified as an unlawful act against the State 
(Schutznorm issue) (Cf. Braams 1996, p. 977 and Widdershoven 2000, p. 247).37 If 
that is not the case, the losses cannot be recovered under private liability law. It is 
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therefore desirable to come to a right of recourse under public law, whereby losses 
may be recovered insofar as they have been caused by a failure of a local or regional 
administrative body. 
For errors in the implementation of the structural funds such right of recourse under 
Dutch public law has already been laid down in the European Subsidies Supervision 
Act. The government has announced that it will draft legislation which provides for 
a general right of recourse. Regulation in the GALA seems obvious. 
5.4 Risk inventory
Research has shown that in the Netherlands it regularly occurs that private 
individuals contest decisions of local and regional administrative bodies because 
of breach of Community law. It happens less often that private individuals hold 
local and regional authorities liable for the losses resulting from this. As far as we 
could verify, in those proceedings the State is only held (jointly) liable insofar as the 
(alleged) unlawful act of the local or regional authorities involved is (partly) due to 
the central government. Well-known examples are cases in which the delayed or 
incorrect implementation of directives into Dutch legislation plays a role. Because 
of this local and regional authorities must carry out legislation which does not pass 
the European legal muster. So it concerns cases whereby the central government 
has (also) been negligent. In this sort of cases losses cannot be avoided with stricter 
or broader supervisory instruments. Moreover recovery of the losses from the local 
or regional authorities is then not really obvious. More than that, for these cases a 
‘reversed right of recourse’ of the local or regional authorities on the State is sometimes 
argued for. 
We do not know of any examples of situations in which the Dutch State is sued 
for breach of European law by local and regional authorities, e.g. since the local or 
regional authorities cannot or do not want to pay.38
When the European Commission is of the opinion that local and regional authorities 
act contrary to Community law, it may eventually lead to an infraction procedure by 
virtue of Article 226 EC. In this context, no Dutch cases are known in which such 
a procedure has led to the imposition of a sanction as provided in Article 228 EC. 
Apparently local and regional authorities are usually prepared and capable to remedy 
breaches of Community law observed by the Commission or a (European) court. 
That is apparently not only the case in the Netherlands: in Belgium, where already 
since 1980 a ‘substitution mechanism’ exists for those cases, this possibility has so 
far never been used.39 So in this area there neither seems to be great (financial) risks 
for the Netherlands. 
Then there only remain the ‘other losses’ which may be the consequence of breach 
of Community law by local and regional authorities. We have already mentioned the 
example of the contributions which the Netherlands received in the period 1994-
1999 from the European Social Fund (ESF) and of which part has been recovered 
by the Commission, after irregularities in the implementation had been observed. 
This case of a defective implementation and enforcement of Community incentive 
measures is not an isolated case, as is for instance shown by the recent commotion 
23
in the Netherlands in connection with the implementation of the European Fund for 
Regional Development (EFRD). 
It has therefore been investigated if in these cases breach of Community law by 
the local and regional authorities involved in the implementation and the resulting 
recovery by the Commission might have been avoided when supervisory powers for 
the government and a division of liability between the various national authorities 
involved had been better regulated in the Dutch legislation. A study of the Dutch 
ESF case law and the literature about the ESF affair led to the conclusion that 
such is not plausible. If at the time the competent minister would have had the 
authority to issue preventive instructions, the implementation of the ESF in the 
Netherlands would probably not have been greatly different. The picture emerges 
that the concrete requirements which ESF projects had to satisfy in the nineties did 
not follow very clearly from the applicable European regulations, that the Dutch 
implementation regulations left much to be desired, that the central government did 
not always adhere to the legal rules that were available and to the interpretation given 
to them by the Commission and that subsidy recipients (mostly local and regional 
authorities) sometimes used the scope offered to them in this way. There was certainly 
no question of a unilateral, stubborn refusal by local and regional authorities to 
fulfil their Community obligations. It therefore does not seem probable that in those 
circumstances the competent minister would have been able to make a meaningful 
use of a power to give preventive instructions. Qualitatively better implementation 
regulations could have contributed more to a correct implementation practice. 
5.5 How can the implementation of European Community law be facilitated?
Does this then mean that the extension of the ministerial powers in the field of 
administrative supervision and the regulation of a right of recourse under public law will 
have no effect in practice? Will it not improve the effective incorporation of European 
law? In other words: do we have here an example of a case in which a proactive approach 
involving a lot of effort and resources leads to rather unappealing results? 
This conclusion cannot be drawn from the research. In cases in which local 
and regional authorities are (jointly) responsible for breaches of Community law 
in practice it sometimes turns out to be difficult to let these authorities bear the 
losses resulting from those breaches. That is an undesirable situation: passing on the 
financial risks is probably one of the most effective ways to force local and regional 
authorities to study more closely the European regulations and to become aware of 
obligations resulting from them. But it will need further thought how to give shape 
to that right of recourse. Especially when the right of recourse is combined with 
supervisory powers for the central government. All kinds of awkward questions lie 
in wait. Is a central government which supervises local and regional authorities not 
jointly responsible for any errors made? Can local and regional authorities evade their 
responsibility and liability by asking in awkward cases for an instruction from the 
minister? And will the supervisory powers be seriously used in practice? Reports of 
the Dutch General Court of Auditors and the Dutch case law on the implementation 
of European incentive measures show that in practice it will not even be easy to 
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provide an adequate framework for monitoring activities afterwards. From this the 
picture emerges of a heavy administrative work load. In these circumstances it seems 
to be a too ambitious plan for the Netherlands to successfully implement preventive 
supervision which will result in an effective reaction to interim signals in the form 
of specific, preventive instructions. From the perspective of limiting the financial 
risks for the State it therefore seems sensible to be sparing with the introduction of 
preventive instruction powers.
From studying the question to what extent Dutch general administrative law may 
contribute to the (more) effective implementation of Community law the conclusion 
in respect of administrative supervision is that there seem to be possibilities for 
this. Although in general no specific requirements about the organisation of the 
administrative supervision in the member states can be derived from EC law (Cf. 
Meuwese & Den Ouden 2005, p. 89-108), setting up such supervision may actually 
help to improve the implementation and enforcement of Community law by local 
and regional authorities. The latter will probably act more carefully because they 
run financial risks. So the PF-method may lead to desirable results. A clearly shaped 
inter-administrative right of recourse laid down in Title 10.2 of the GALA seems in 
this respect especially attractive. From the perspective of the administrative practice, 
where lack of clarity about the financial risks leads to behaviour by which risks may 
indeed be avoided, but which can have other unpleasant consequences, it also seems 
desirable that a well thought-out inter-administrative right of recourse is worked out. 
An example is the underutilization of budgets which Europe has made available to 
the Netherlands (Cf. Lagrouw, Den Ouden & Groothuis 2006, p. 303-307). So, the 
regulation of mutual government liability from a European perspective is a subject 
which deserves our attention in the coming years.
6.  The embedding of the preliminary proceedings in the national law 
of administrative procedure
6.1 Introduction
The preliminary proceedings procedure at the ECJ play a large role in the process 
of the incorporation of European law, since it enables the national courts to properly 
implement European law at the national level. In particular, the preliminary proceedings 
have enabled the ECJ to give shape to its role as engine of the European integration 
process. Almost all important legal concepts, such as supremacy and direct effect of 
Community law and the liability of member states for its breach, have been developed 
by the ECJ further to preliminary questions. In this way the cooperation with the ECJ 
through the preliminary proceedings does not only serve to an important extent the 
unity of law (by ensuring a uniform interpretation of European law in all member 
states), but is also crucial for the development of law (Meij 1999, p. 140). In addition 
the preliminary proceedings contribute to the legal protection of private individuals. 
The fact is that private individuals have only to a limited extent direct access to the 
CFI and the ECJ and depend chiefly on the national courts for legal protection in cases 
in which European law plays a role (Vermeulen 2001, p. 47-49).40
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Dutch administrative courts are responsible for a large part of the preliminary 
questions submitted from the Netherlands to the ECJ (Cf. Meij 1999, p. 154-155; 
Mortelmans, Van Ooik & Prechal 2004, p. 59-62). These questions often concern 
the interpretation of specific (material) rules, but it also regularly happens that it 
concerns issues which directly touch on the modelling of general administrative law 
(of procedure) and thus also often on the Dutch GALA. Examples of the latter are the 
tenability of appeal periods, ex officio review, the adequacy of fixed compensation of 
legal costs, the review obligation in case of conflict with European law and liability 
for breach of European law (Cf. Widdershoven et al. 2007, par. 7.4).41 So, preliminary 
proceedings are not only of interest for the correct application of European law in a 
concrete case, but also for modelling the material and procedural (administrative) 
law in a general sense, within the framework of the GALA or otherwise.
Starting from this great importance of properly functioning preliminary proceedings 
the embedding of this procedure in Dutch general administrative law (of procedure) 
has been studied on the basis of an analysis of literature and case law. Central question 
was how Dutch general administrative law (of procedure) may further facilitate the 
proper functioning of the preliminary proceedings (and with it the implementation 
of European Community law). For this purpose attention is paid in particular to the 
Dutch legal practice in this respect, whereby we have also looked for bottlenecks and 
solutions to them.42
6.2 The preliminary proceedings in Dutch general administrative law 
(of procedure)
The research has shown that for the question of whether and, if so, how a matter 
must be referred to the ECJ, the Dutch administrative courts rely almost entirely on 
Article 234 EC and the case law of the ECJ on this article. For this reason the European 
law in respect of the preliminary proceedings as well as the ‘practical suggestions’ in 
this respect which the ECJ has published are to a great extent decisive for the Dutch 
legal practice.
The most urgent problem of the preliminary proceedings is that they take too long. 
It has been noted that there is a risk that for that reason courts may decide not to 
refer a matter. From the viewpoint of the development and effective implementation 
of European law – in which the preliminary proceedings play a crucial role – this is 
questionable, but otherwise not always incomprehensible. It is important that this 
problem will be speedily dealt with, especially by extending the processing capacity 
in Luxembourg. If this does not happen, it will become difficult to maintain the case 
law in respect of state liability for the improper application of European law in cases 
in which wrongly no preliminary questions have been asked.
On the more national (Dutch) side of the preliminary proceedings no great problems 
arise in the sense that there is conflict with European law. According to the traditional 
method one might therefore opt for not taking any further actions. However if we look 
from the viewpoint of the PF-method to the way in which the preliminary proceedings 
have been embedded in Dutch administrative law, a number of issues may be pointed 
out in respect of which facilitating measures might be relevant for promoting the 
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effective incorporation of European law. Concisely stated, in this respect it concerns 
material restraint of the national courts in respect of asking questions, a lack of 
coordination between the various (highest) administrative courts (the Netherlands has 
as many as four of them), a too varied practice in respect of the structure of referral 
orders by the courts and associated national proceedings and the unclear position 
of the parties involved. The lack of a regulation in respect of a number of specific 
procedural issues is a further point of special interest. For instance, formally the 
GALA does not provide for an ‘interlocutory ruling’, but in practice it is nevertheless 
used by Dutch administrative courts for referral; there is no possibility of appeal 
from such a ruling and at present under the GALA the courts cannot ex officio grant 
injunctive relief pending the preliminary proceedings while the effective operation 
of Community law may give reason for this.
6.3 How can the implementation of European Community law be facilitated?
To further facilitate the implementation of European law in this respect three 
measures have been proposed, which have been discussed in outline and whose 
implementation still requires further study.
To start with, a regulation must be included, preferably in the GALA, in respect of 
the preliminary referral, whereby the ‘suggestions’ published by the ECJ are a useful 
starting point. There are also examples of this in other European countries, so that a 
comparative law study may contribute to an adequate regulation.43 An alternative to 
this might be to supplement the various rules of procedure of the administrative courts 
(policy rules to which the various courts have bound themselves in principle, but do 
not have the status of law) with provisions about the preliminary proceedings.
In addition it is of great interest that the (substantive) coordination of (material) 
referral problems between the courts involved will be improved. Some proposals 
have also been made for this, whereby it has been established that the desirable 
coordination may probably be achieved most effectively when the Supreme Court 
is placed at the top of the administrative legal system (with maybe a sort of leave 
to appeal system in order to avoid that proceedings take too long). The fact is that 
in the current organisational framework the formal partitions between the different 
administrative law courts involved have an impeding effect. A further aspect is that 
in the proposed new framework better coordination with civil law and criminal law 
will also be possible, fields in which the influence of European law is increasing.
Finally it has been proposed to further intensify the training of judges in European 
law. A better 
knowledge of and sensitivity for European law – of course always in relation to 
the relevant national law – will achieve that except for better reasoned referral orders 
the judge involved may also be able to make at a better selection of which cases to 
refer and which not. In this way a better training might also contribute to limiting 
the influx of cases at the ECJ and with it to a solution of the greatest bottleneck in 
the current preliminary proceedings, namely its too long duration.
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7. Conclusion
The study on the four subtopics of this paper shows that the proposed PF-method 
may enhance the effective implementation of European Community law in the national 
(Dutch) legal system in several ways. 
A basic law of general administrative law, such as the GALA, fulfils an essential 
function in this respect. Given the general nature of this statutory regulation, the 
provisions included in it may be formulated in such a way that they can ensure an 
effective incorporation of Community law on various special fields of law. Already 
now the GALA offers examples of European oriented provisions of a general problem 
solving or facilitating nature. For instance in Title 1.2 it has been provided that the 
usual statutory obligations to seek advice or hold consultations do not apply when 
taking implementation decisions that are necessary for the implementation of binding 
orders of bodies of the European Communities (EC), so that such decisions might be 
taken faster and simpler. 
In this study various other provisions of general administrative law, although not 
all necessarily resulting from Community law obligations, have been proposed which 
may simplify the implementation of EC law for Dutch administrative bodies. For the 
recovery of unlawful state aid a general regulation with such purpose seems to be 
indispensable in order to be able to fulfil Community obligations. With a view to a 
better embedding of the preliminary proceedings in Dutch administrative law a general 
regulation in the GALA has been proposed. It offers an example of how national 
general administrative law may facilitate the implementation of Community law. The 
same applies for a regulation still to be designed for an inter-administrative right of 
recourse for those cases in which local and regional authorities make errors which lead 
to liability and losses for the member state the Netherlands. When it will be possible 
to confront local and regional authorities with the financial consequences of their 
negligence, they will probably act more carefully when observing or implementing 
European rules of law. 
In order to give concrete shape to general rules of law which may safeguard or 
facilitate Community law in the national legal system, some further study and thought 
will be required. It should be taken into account that two legal systems, the European 
and the national (Dutch), are literally coming together. In that respect the PF-method 
does not differ from the traditional method: in order to be able to be really effective, 
new rules of law will always have to be formulated in a careful and balanced manner, 
taking into account the basic principles and special features of the national legal 
system, applied in a Community context.
It is not only the legislator which has responsibilities in this field. This study 
shows that an important role has also been reserved for the highest administrative 
courts. They can facilitate the incorporation of Community law into the national legal 
system by choosing in their case law, when applying national provisions of general 
administrative law, the approach which fits in with relevant European case law and 
the approach used or the requirements formulated in the latter in this respect. In this 
way a more intensive check by the national courts whether a decision is based on 
sound fact-finding may not only contribute to effective legal protection and definitive 
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dispute settlement, but it will also reduce the chance that the court will fail to see 
a breach of Community law. In addition, in relation to the preliminary proceedings 
attention has been drawn to the importance of coordination in respect of (material) 
referral questions between the courts involved and to the importance of intensifying 
the training of judges in European law.
With this it may be concluded that using the PF-method may be meaningful 
in the sense that it improves the incorporation of European law. This removes a 
number of disadvantages of the traditional method, which implies that the legal 
implementation, application and enforcement of European law is simplified and 
facilitated for Dutch regulators, administrative bodies and administrative courts 
charged with those tasks.
The measures for facilitating the incorporation of European law which have been 
proposed on the basis of the PF-method enhance the legal certainty. The use of 
the PF-method may further contribute to more coherence between national law and 
European law now that this method may be used to trace earlier and solve the so-called 
‘reversed discrimination’ of national law compared to European law. Furthermore 
the use of this method may also reduce the risk that conflict arises with European 
law by untimely or inadequate implementation of European legal provisions with all 
associated legal and financial consequences. Contrary to the traditional method, a 
proactive approach further also offers more possibilities to still actually influence the 
policy-making and legislation on the European stage instead of assuming a defensive 
attitude. However, it should be kept in mind that the use of the PF-method requires 
a substantial investment both in time and money. Nevertheless the advantages of the 
use of this method are so evident that we are of the opinion that we must be willing 
to make the necessary investments for this. These investments will repay themselves 
in the long run. After all, if the national law is proactively tailored to the effective 
incorporation of European law, the chance of infraction proceedings will considerably 
diminish and consequently the chance that the member state will be ordered to pay 
penalties because of breach of Community law.
Finally, does the use of the PF-method have no other than financial limits? In 
our opinion it certainly has. The usefulness and necessity of its use must always be 
carefully weighed, whereby the problem of a level playing field must be kept in mind. 
By a too strict implementation of European law or an overzealous enforcer citizens 
and businesses may be substantially prejudiced compared to subjects of other member 
states. Proper balancing is essential.
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